Economic Shocks and Exchange Rate as a Shock Absorber in Indonesia and Thailand by Goo, Siwei & Siregar, Reza Y. Siregar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Economic Shocks and Exchange Rate as
a Shock Absorber in Indonesia and
Thailand
Siwei Goo and Reza Y. Siregar Siregar
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Australia, The
South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training
Centre, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
19. August 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16875/
MPRA Paper No. 16875, posted 21. August 2009 09:13 UTC
  
 
 
Economic Shocks and Exchange Rate as a Shock Absorber  
in Indonesia and Thailand 
 
Siwei Goo and Reza Siregar 
 
Draft: August 2009 
 
 
----------------------------- 
1/ Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, (Corresponding Author) E-mail: 
siwei.goo@gmail.com  
2/ The South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. E-mail: reza@seacen.org and rezasiregar@yahoo.com. 
Acknowledgment: We would like to thank Michael Artis and Michael Ehrmann for sharing 
their computer code. Excellent research assistance by Bernard Ting is also acknowledged. 
The initial draft of the paper was completed during the corresponding author’s stay at the 
School of Economics, University of Adelaide, Australia. The views expressed in this paper 
are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent those of the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the University of Adelaide, and the SEACEN Centre. 
  
 1
 
Economic Shocks and Exchange Rate as a Shock Absorber  
in Indonesia and Thailand  
 
Abstract: 
This study investigates the requirement for the exchange rate to be a shock absorber in 
Indonesia and Thailand from 1986 to 2007. In general, we find that the economic shocks 
have predominantly been asymmetric relative to the US and the Japanese economies. Yet, the 
weights attached to the US dollar remain respectably high in the exchange rate management 
of the rupiah and the baht, in particular for the latter currency, during the post-1997 crisis. 
Hence, relinquishing the role of exchange rate as a shock absorber has been costly during 
both the pre-and the post-1997 crisis periods for these Southeast Asian countries. 
Furthermore, it is arguably more costly for Thailand during the post-1997, and for Indonesia 
during the pre-1997 crisis.    
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1. Introduction 
 Among a number of perennial macroeconomic policy debates, the contention on 
finding the appropriate exchange rate regime continues to attract a large number of studies. 
In general, these early works prescribe a more flexible exchange rate for any country moving 
to liberalize its domestic economy. Eichengreen (1994),  Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Chang and 
Valesco (2000) and Wyplosz (2001) for instance contend that  it is crucial to realize ex ante 
that liberalization rocks foreign exchange markets, and building some form of exchange rate 
flexibility (either by floating or by being prepared to realign pegs) into the liberalization 
program is, therefore, essential. 
The argument linking a more flexible exchange rate to economic liberalization does 
not however advance without rebukes and caveats. The source of financing and the degree of 
financial openness also matter. Goldfajn and Olivares (2001) conclude that flexible regimes 
are viable in financially open economies, provided that external financing is not based on 
very volatile capital. In the absence of full international financial markets, Devereux (2004) 
demonstrates theoretically that although a flexible exchange rate acts perfectly as a shock 
absorber of global demand shocks, in welfare terms it may in fact be better off to prevent the 
exchange rate from moving at all (pg.360).  
  Moreover, the characteristics and features of real economic shocks, i.e. demand and 
supply shocks, have also been identified as another influential determinants of a country’s 
exchange rate regime. When these shocks are largely symmetric relative to the major trading 
partners , the common view in the literature is that the flexibility of the exchange rate policy 
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should therefore not be an issue. However, if they are primarily asymmetrical, then the role 
of exchange rate as a shock absorber is desirable.  
  Despite the importance of the issue, particularly for designing effective monetary and 
exchange rate policies, and the numerous works on the developed economies, still very little 
works have been carried out on the emerging markets, particularly on the major Southeast 
Asian economies that had experienced severe financial crisis about a decade ago.1 Yet, a 
similar set of monetary and exchange rate policy challenges resurfaced with the global 
outbreak of the sub-prime crisis starting 2007. In the midst of the global financial market 
uncertainties, major Southeast Asian economies, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philipines, 
Thailand and Singapore, have been forced to reassess and adjust their monetary and 
exchange rate priorities. 
To help fill in the gap in the literature, the primary objective of our paper is to 
examine the experiences of two most-severely affected economies by the 1997 East Asian 
crisis, namely Indonesia and Thailand, during the past two decades. In particular, we wish to 
address the following two questions: 
a) Have the economic shocks that Indonesia and Thailand had to face relative 
to their two key trading partners, namely Japan and the US, during the 
previous two decades have predominantly been symmetrical or 
asymmetrical ones?  
b) Has there been any necessity for the exchange rate to be a shock absorber 
in these two Southeast Asian economies since the mid-1980s? Has this 
requirement become more pertinent during the post-1997 financial crisis?  
                                               
1
 We will review works being done on these issues in Section two of the paper. 
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 To achieve our objectives, we would employ a structural VAR framework with long-
run and short-run restrictions of Artis and Ehrmann (2006). This approach incorporates a 
methodology introduced by Smets (1997) to identify domestic monetary policy shocks, 
especially on the weights that the monetary authorities attached to exchange rate. These 
approaches enable us to disentangle the role and contribution of exchange rate and interest 
rate in monetary policy shocks. At the final stage, the impulse response analyses will be 
employed to explore the characteristics of the economic shocks and the requirement for the 
exchange rate to be a shock absorber in Indonesia and Thailand during the past two decades.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. Next section briefly reviews the literature. Section 
three introduces the empirical approaches of Artis and Ehrmann (2006) and Smets (1997). 
The following section discusses the data sets and the unit root properties. Section four on test 
results extensively analyzes the empirical findings and addresses the set of questions posted 
earlier. The conclusion section ends the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 Numerous efforts have been extended to identify the types of economic shocks and 
their impacts on the local economies in the past two decades. Most of these studies adopted a 
structural VAR framework with long-run identifying restrictions, introduced by the seminal 
work of Blanchard and Quah (1989), as the basic framework to their empirical works. 
Lastrapes (1992) for instance finds that the real and nominal exchange rate fluctuations 
during the floating exchange rate period are due primarily to real shocks in six developed 
economies, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Japan and 
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Canada. The study however fails to distinguish whether the real shocks were originated from 
the demand or the supply shocks. 
Extending the bivariate VAR model of Lastrapes (1992), Clarida and Gali (1994) 
estimate a three-equation open macroeconomic model to identify three structural shocks, i.e. 
two real shocks (demand and supply) and monetary (nominal) shocks, to examine the sources 
of real exchange rate fluctuations in Japan, Germany, Britain and Canada during the post 
Bretton Woods period. The trivariate VAR model consists of the relative output growth, the 
first difference in real exchange rate and the relative rate of inflation, in which all of the three 
variables under consideration are specified as relative to the corresponding variables of the 
large neighbours. Based on their findings, Clarida and Gali (1994) argue that for Germany 
and Japan, nominal shocks as well as demand shocks explain a substantial amount of the 
variance in the dollar-Deutsch mark and the dollar-yen real exchange rates. However, 
nominal shocks explain very little of the variance in the real exchange rate for Canada and 
Britain. Similarly, supply shocks in all cases account for very little variance of the real 
exchange rate relative to the dollar. 
Applying the long run identification scheme of Clarida and Gali (1994), Chadha and 
Prasad (1996) and Thomas (1997) examine the relationship between the real exchange rate 
and the business cycle in Japan and Sweden respectively after the collapse of Bretton Woods 
system. In addition, both studies specify the variables in their VAR systems in relative terms 
to Japan’s and Sweden’s foreign counterparts. From their structural decomposition, Chadha 
and Prasad (1996) find that the variation in Japan’s output growth was largely due to supply 
shocks while demand shocks played an important but only secondary role. The real exchange 
rate change, on the other hand, was driven equally by demand and nominal shocks with 
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supply shocks performed a minor role. Moreover, the variation in the rate of inflation was 
mainly influenced by supply and nominal shocks with the latter shocks became increasingly 
significant at longer horizons. 
 On the other hand, Thomas (1997) probes the relative importance of real and nominal 
shocks in explaining the fluctuations of the real exchange rate in Sweden. The policy 
objective of the study is to assess the potential cost of giving up exchange rate as the 
instrument of the macroeconomic policy adjustment in Sweden, i.e. as a shock absorber, 
required for participating in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The study finds that 
real shocks (demand and supply shocks) account for over 60 percent of the forecast error 
variance of real exchange rate. Moreover, demand shocks account for a significantly higher 
fraction of the real shocks in Sweden as compared to other core EMU countries. The study 
contends that the cost of abandoning the exchange rate as an instrument of monetary policy is 
no higher and may be lower for Sweden than for most of the main EMU countries. 
 An interesting work by Smets (1997) appraises the role of the European Currency 
Unit (ECU) exchange rate in the monetary policy strategy of France, Germany and Italy. The 
principal contribution of this study is in its attempt to distinguish between interest rate and 
exchange rate innovations that are due to domestic monetary policy shocks and those that are 
due to monetary authorities’ response to exchange rate movements. The study proposes an 
approach whereby the first empirical step is to estimate the weight of exchange rate in the 
short run reaction function of the domestic monetary authority using instrument variable 
technique, and then employs the estimated weights of exchange rate to identify the domestic 
monetary policy shock and its effects on output, prices, interest rate and exchange rate. The 
study claims that the responses of output, prices, interest rate and exchange rate to monetary 
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policy shocks in these three major European economies are consistent with the standard open 
economy model. In particular, taking into account the role of exchange rate in the monetary 
policy formulation explicitly, the study is able to solve the exchange rate puzzle, i.e. 
exchange rate depreciates instead of appreciating, following a monetary policy tightening. 
 In their recent works, Artis and Ehrmann (2006) explore the following important 
policy question: Was the exchange rate a shock absorber or a source of  its own destabilising 
shocks in the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden and Denmark? Their study applies a 
structural VAR framework with the mixed of long run and short run identification 
restrictions pioneered by Gali (1992). They claim that exchange rate can only act as a shock 
absorber if the domestic economy is hit by an asymmetric shock as compared to its foreign 
counterparts. Most of early works however failed to determine if real shocks that hit 
domestic economy are symmetric or idiosyncratic in nature, largely due to the fact that the 
key variables in their VAR systems are constructed in the relative term to the corresponding 
variables of the neighbouring countries (Smets, 1997; Thomas, 1997). Under this type of 
construction, it becomes difficult to separate whether shocks were originated from the 
domestic economy or trading partners’ economies.  
To overcome this shortcoming, Artis and Ehrmann (2006) include the foreign interest 
rate variables into their VAR systems that are not formulated in relative term. Moreover, 
Artis and Ehrmann (2006) apply the Smets (1997) approach to disentangle domestic 
monetary policy shocks from exchange rate shocks using the calculated weights which 
central banks attached to exchange rate development when setting their domestic monetary 
policies.  Their study concludes that real shocks are predominantly symmetric relative to the 
neighbours in all countries of focused except for the United Kingdom. Hence, there is little 
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need for the exchange rate to act as a shock absorber in Canada, Sweden and Denmark. In 
addition, shocks that are generated from the exchange rate market appear to play a more 
important role in Denmark than other countries. They, therefore, argue that monetary union is 
easier to recommend for Denmark and Sweden than it is for Canada and the United 
Kingdom. 
Despite those numerous efforts, to our knowledge only few works have looked into 
these important monetary policy issues for the East Asian economies. Hataiseree (1998) 
examines the role of exchange rate in Thailand’s Monetary Condition Index (MCI)2, and 
claims that during the period from 1990 to 1998, the weight of exchange rate in Thailand’s 
MCI is 0.33 for the baht nominal effective exchange rate, and that exchange rate plays an 
increasing role in transmitting the effects of monetary policy to real economy.  
 Using a simple VAR framework, Fung (2002) examines the effects of monetary 
policy shocks in seven East Asian economies, including Indonesia and Thailand during 1985 
to 2001, the pre-1997 and the post-1997 Asian financial crisis. The study employs the 
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) methodology to calculate the weight of exchange rate in the 
MCI for nominal effective exchange rate to capture explicitly the importance of exchange 
rate in the domestic monetary policy measures. The author further assumes that domestic 
interest rate is the policy instrument and domestic monetary policy shocks do not affect the 
exchange rate contemporaneously. The results however were not conclusive, especially for 
                                               
2
  The monetary condition index (MCI) is a weighted average of short term interest rate and 
exchange rate, and is often used to measure the stance of monetary policy in open economies.  
  
 9
the estimated weights of the exchange rate and eventually had to be replaced with weights of 
the exchange rate based on the openness of the economy. 
 As stated earlier, our study aims at extending and enriching the current literature on 
the role of exchange rate in the developing countries by specifically examining the cases of 
Indonesia and Thailand during the period from 1986 to 2007. Applying the structural VAR 
identification scheme with short run and long run identifying restrictions of Artis and 
Ehrmann (2006), we hope to investigate the requirement for the exchange rate to be a shock 
absorber in these economies during the last two decades. Furthermore, by harnessing the 
approach introduced by Smets (1997) to estimate the role of exchange rate when identifying 
the domestic monetary policy shocks, we can resolve the endogeneity problem between 
exchange rate and domestic interest rate in the Hataiseree (1998) and Fung (2002) studies.  
 
3. Empirical Methodologies 
Turning into the empirical approaches, this section would first summarize the 
structural VAR framework with the long run and short run restrictions of Artis and Ehrmann 
(2006) to identify five structural shocks, i.e., the supply and demand shocks, the foreign and 
domestic monetary policy shocks and the exchange rate shocks. We would then briefly 
introduce the basic frameworks of Smets (1997) methodology for estimating the weights of 
exchange rate when the monetary authorities in Indonesia and Thailand set their domestic 
monetary policy measures.  Once the structural VAR model has been identified, the impulse 
response functions and the forecast error variance decompositions can then be estimated.  
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3.1 The Structure of the VAR Model of Artis and Ehrmann (2006) 
 Following Artis and Ehrmann (2006), the structural VAR model in this study can be 
represented by ],,,,[ * ′∆∆∆≡ ttttt epiiyx , where all variables except interest rates are in 
natural log. ty∆  denotes the domestic output growth, 
*
ti  is the foreign short-term nominal 
interest rate, ti  is the domestic short-term nominal interest rate, tp∆  denotes the domestic 
rate of inflation, and te∆  denotes the rate of appreciation of the nominal exchange rate of 
home currency against its foreign currencies. The domestic economy is subject to 5 structural 
shocks ],,,,[ * ′≡ etmtmtdtSt εεεεεε . Here, we have two real shocks, namely the supply shocks 
( stε ) and the demand shocks ( dtε ), and three nominal shocks, including the foreign monetary 
policy shocks ( *mtε ), the domestic monetary policy shocks ( mtε ), and the exchange rate 
shocks ( etε ).  
As in Gali (1992) and  Artis and Ehrmann (2006), our structural VAR model utilizes 
a combination of long run and short run identifying restrictions. To start with, the following 
five sets of restrictions are to be imposed in our VAR system to recover the structural 
model.3  
a) First, we impose an orthogonality condition among the five structural shocks, 
which implies that the structural shocks are mutually uncorrelated. This 
restriction implies that the channels through which each structural shock will 
affect the economy are left unconstrained. 
                                               
3
  The detail implementation of the identifying restrictions imposed to recover the structural model 
will be fully elaborated in the next sub-section.  
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b) The second set of restrictions will differentiate the supply shocks from the 
four remaining shocks by assuming that only supply shocks have long run 
effect on output following Blanchard and Quah (1989).  
c) The third set of restrictions will distinguish the demand shocks from the 
remaining three nominal shocks by assuming that demand shock is the only 
shock that can influence output contemporaneously.  
d) The fourth set of restrictions will sort out the foreign monetary policy shocks 
from the domestic monetary policy shocks and the exchange rate shocks. Our 
study assumes that foreign interest rate does not respond contemporaneously 
to domestic monetary policy shocks or to exchange rate shocks. This 
restriction is reasonable for the purpose of this study since Indonesia and 
Thailand are arguably small open economies relative to their major trading 
partners, such as the US and Japan.  
e) Finally, to disentangle the two types of domestic nominal shocks (i.e. 
domestic monetary policy shocks and exchange rate shocks), we would first 
calculate the weight, ω , which central banks attach to exchange rate 
development when setting monetary policy as introduced by Smets (1997) .  
Once all the effects of supply, demand and foreign monetary policy shocks on the 
domestic interest rate and the exchange rate have been removed, the unexplained components 
of the interest rate and the exchange rate can therefore be attributed entirely to domestic 
monetary policy and exchange rate shocks. The reduced-form empirical model of monetary 
policy behaviour and the foreign exchange market can then be presented as follows: 
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Where: the left-hand side variables, itu  and 
e
tu , are the reduced-form residuals for domestic 
interest rate and exchange rate respectively.  
 Equation 1 denotes that the central bank controls domestic short-term interest rate and 
adjusts this instrument either to changes in the stance of domestic monetary policy ( mtε ) or in 
response to foreign exchange market disturbances ( etε ). Similarly, the current exchange rate 
also depends on domestic monetary policy shocks and exchange rate shocks (Equation 2). 
Solving Equations (1 and 2) for domestic monetary policy shocks, mtε , in terms of the 
reduced-form interest rate and exchange rate residuals yields: 
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=      (3) 
Normalising ( 1,1 11 == βα ) and the sum of the weights on the domestic interest rate and 
exchange rate residuals to one, result in the following expression: 
  
e
t
i
t
m
t uu ωωε +−= )1(          (4) 
Equation 4 can be interpreted as short run monetary condition index (MCI). The relative 
weight of exchange rate in the MCI is given by )/( 222 αβαω −−= . In a successful 
identification scheme, one would expect 2α , which captures the effect of exchange rate 
shocks on domestic interest rate, to be non-positive since an appreciation of exchange rate 
should lead to a fall in interest rate; and 2β , which captures the effect of exchange rate 
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shocks on exchange rate itself, to be positive. Therefore, the relative weight of exchange rate 
in MCI, ω , should lie between zero and one. 
 If the value of ω  is known, the remaining identification problem is solved since one 
can define the domestic monetary policy shocks according to Equation 4. One of the main 
advantages of focusing on this weight to identify domestic monetary policy shocks is that it 
encompasses not only two extreme cases of interest rate and exchange rate targeting but also 
the intermediate cases, which is very much related to the experience of Indonesia and 
Thailand. In a pure interest rate targeting regime, the relative weight of exchange rate on the 
MCI will be equal to zero ( 0=ω ) since the monetary authorities ignore the effect of 
exchange rate when setting domestic interest rate ( 02 =α ).  
On the other hand, in a pure exchange rate targeting regime ( 1=ω ), there will be a 
one-to-one relationship between domestic monetary policy shocks and exchange rate 
innovations since the central bank will not allow the foreign exchange market disturbances to 
affect the exchange rate ( 02 =β ). For the case of Indonesia and Thailand, one would expect 
that the relative weight of exchange rate in domestic monetary policy measure to be some 
positive value, since the monetary authorities in these countries actively manage their 
exchange rate. 
 Smets (1997) and Artis and Ehrmann (2006) suggest that ω  can be estimated by 
transforming Equation 4 into the following regression model: 
 
m
t
e
t
i
t uu εωω
ω
−
+
−
−=
1
1
1
       (5) 
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Equation 5 implies that the observed reduced-form residuals for interest rate ( itu ) is 
explained by the observable reduced-form residuals for exchange rate ( etu ) and a random 
shock, mtεω−1
1
. We estimate Equation 5 by adopting Shapiro and Watson (1988) sequential 
instrument variable technique, using shocks to the Australia RBA’s cash rate and the 
exchange rate of deutschemark against the Australian dollar as instruments.4 The shocks to 
the instruments are obtained by regressing each of the instrument variables on its own lags, 
the lags of the endogenous variables in the VAR systems, and the estimated supply, demand 
and foreign monetary policy shocks.5   
 
 3.1.1 The Specification and Implementation of Identifying Restrictions 
As introduced earlier, ],,,,[ * ′∆∆∆≡ ttttt epiiyx  is a ( )15×  vector. It is assumed that x  
is a covariance stationary vector process, and it has the following vector moving average 
representation form: 
 εx )(LC=          (6) 
                                               
4
   For instrument variables, we need to adopt the policy rate and the exchange rate of the major 
trading partners of Indonesia and Thailand. Since relevant key economic indicators from the 
Japanese and the US economy are already considered explicitly in our structural VAR system, we 
opt to use the Australia RBA’s cash rate and the Australian dollar against deutschemark to be the 
instrumental variables for Equation 5. The Australian dollar is chosen based on two criteria. First, 
the country is one of the major economic partners of Indonesia and Thailand (refer to Bowman 
(2005)). Second, the Australian exchange rate policy is considered among the most flexible 
regime in the world. 
5
  The lag length chosen to estimate ω  is reported in Table 2 and these lags are chosen to minimise 
the AIC criteria and to ensure that the residuals are well specified.  
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where ],,,,[ * ′≡ etmtmtdtSt εεεεεε  is the 5 by 1 vector of serially uncorrelated structural 
disturbances (i.e. the supply shocks, demand shocks, foreign monetary policy shocks, 
domestic monetary policy shocks and exchange rate shocks respectively). The 55× matrix of 
polynomial lags )]([)( LCLC ij≡ , for 5,...,1, =ji  is the object to be estimated. Once matrix 
)(LC  has been estimated, the expressions for the levels of different variables in terms of the 
current and lagged values of the structural disturbances can be recovered. 
The reduced-form Wold moving average representation of x  is: 
 ux )(LR=          (7) 
where u  is a 5 by 1 vector of reduced-form disturbance, and )]([)( LRLR ij≡ , for 
5,...,1, =ji , IR =)0(  and )(LR  is invertible. Moreover, let Σ  denotes the symmetric 
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form innovations u , that is, 'uuE=Σ . 
 The reduced-form autoregressive representation of Equation 7 is given by: 
 ux =)(LB          (8) 
where )]([)( LBLB ij≡  for 5,...,1, =ji , IB =)0(  and 1)()( −= LRLB .  
We assume that there exists a non-singular matrix S  such that the reduced-form 
innovations in u  are to be the linear combinations of the structural disturbances in ε : 
εu S=          (9) 
Therefore from Equations (6, 7 and 9): 
 SLRLC )()( =         (10) 
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Pre-multiplying both sides of Equation 8 by 1−S , the vector autoregressive 
representation of x  in terms of the structural disturbances ε  can be derived: 
εx =)(LA          (11) 
where )]([)( LALA ij≡ , for 5,...,1, =ji  and 1)0( −≡ SA . 
The structural model, i.e. the coefficients of )(LA  and )(LC , can be identified once enough 
restrictions are imposed to determine all components of the matrix S .6 
 Turning into the detail operation of the identification scheme, the assumption of 
mutually uncorrelated shocks, together with a convenient normalisation that each structural 
shock has a unit variance, imply that IE ='εε . Thus from Equation 9, 
 Σ='SS          (12) 
Equation 12 represents fifteen restrictions on matrix S, given Σ . Therefore, ten additional 
restrictions need to be imposed to just-identify the structural model (Table 1). 
 The long run identifying restrictions of R1 to R4, imply that 
0)1()1()1()1( 15141312 ==== CCCC . Thus given Equation 10, the following linear 
restrictions on matrix S can be derived, respectively: 
                                               
6
 Consistent estimates of the coefficients in matrix )(LB  can be obtained from Equation 8 using the 
ordinary least square (OLS) technique. The estimate of matrix )(LR  can then be obtained by 
inverting matrix )(LB . A consistent estimate of the symmetric variance-covariance matrix of the 
reduced form disturbances, Σ , can be computed using the residuals of the OLS regression. From 
Equation 10, given the matrix S , the matrix )(LC  can be recovered by post-multiplying matrix 
)(LR  by matrix S ; while from Equations (8, 9 and 11), matrix )(LA  can be recovered by pre-
multiplying matrix )(LB  by the inversion of matrix S . 
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 0)1()1()1()1()1()1( 5215421432132212121112 =++++≡ SRSRSRSRSRC  (13) 
 0)1()1()1()1()1()1( 5315431433132312131113 =++++≡ SRSRSRSRSRC  (14) 
 0)1()1()1()1()1()1( 5415441434132412141114 =++++≡ SRSRSRSRSRC  (15) 
 0)1()1()1()1()1()1( 5515451435132512151115 =++++≡ SRSRSRSRSRC  (16) 
 Restrictions R5 to R9 imply the following five direct constraints on matrix S: 
 013 =S          (17) 
 014 =S          (18) 
 015 =S          (19) 
024 =S          (20) 
 025 =S          (21) 
By construction, element ijS  measures the contribution of jth structural shock to the 
contemporaneous innovation in the ith element of vector x ,  i.e. the reduced-form residuals 
of ith variables in vector x . 
 Finally, restriction R10 can be implemented as a linear restriction involving some of 
the elements of matrix )0(A . From Equations 9 and 11, εu =)0(A . Therefore, the fourth row 
in matrix )0(A  is associated with the domestic monetary policy shocks. Given the 
specification of vector x  and Equation 4, R10 implies the following constraint on matrix 
)0(A : 
  
 18
 ω−= 1)0(43A  and ω=)0(45A       (22) 
Given 1)0( −≡ AS , Equation 22 maps into one restriction on the element of matrix S. 
 With the identifying restrictions, the structural model (Equations 6 and 11) can be 
recovered from the reduced-form model (Equation 8). We estimate the structural VAR model 
in turn for Indonesia and Thailand for the pre-crisis period (January 1986 to December 1996) 
and the post crisis period (January 2000 to December 2007). For Indonesia, the model is 
estimated using 6 lags for both the pre- and post crisis period; while for Thailand, the model 
is estimated using 5 lags and 4 lags respectively for the pre- and post crisis period7. In 
addition, since it has been a common practice in the monetary VAR models, the world oil 
price inflation and linear time trend are also included in our VAR model as exogenous 
variables8.  
 
3.2 Impulse Response Functions 
 Once the structural VAR model has been identified, we then move to examine the 
two main questions posted in the introduction of this study. For that, we generate the impulse 
response functions of each key variable under the presence of the five structural disturbances 
in the VAR systems, for both the pre- and post-1997 crisis period. Suitably transformed, the 
estimates of )(LC  in Equation 6 can express all the variables of interest, i.e., output, foreign 
                                               
7
  Since the structural VAR involved long run identifying restrictions, this study adopts the above 
mentioned lag length to ensure that the impulse response functions are well identified, although in 
some cases the VAR systems with 3 lags have a smaller AIC statistic. 
8
  The RATS program code  used to estimate this chapter’s structural VAR models is adapted from  
Artis & Ehrmann (2006).  
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interest rate, domestic interest rate, domestic prices and domestic exchange rate in terms of 
the sum of the distributed lags of the five structural disturbances. Formally, 
 εz )(LF=          (23) 
where ],,,,[ * ′≡ ttttt epiiyz  and )]([)( LFLF ij≡ for 5,...,1, =ji . The coefficients of the 
polynomial lag )(LFij  give the estimated dynamic response of vector z’s ith variable to a one 
standard deviation realisation of the jth structural disturbance. Note that the variables in the 
impulse response function are now presented in levels for output, prices and exchange rate 
rather than in their growth rates. 
 As discussed, the need for exchange rate to be a shock absorber arises only when the 
real economic shocks are asymmetrical relative to the country’s trading partners. Shocks that 
are predominantly asymmetric require opposed responses of foreign and domestic monetary 
policy. Accordingly, the trends of the short-run impulse response functions of output, foreign 
interest rate, domestic interest rate, prices and exchange rate to the five structural shocks 
should reveal information needed to address our research queries. 
 
4. Data Description and Unit-Root properties 
The monthly data sets from January 1986 to December 2007 are obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund and the DataStream. 
Since this study is interested in examining the changes in the role of exchange rate during the 
post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period, the observation set will be grouped into 
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the pre-crisis period from January 1986 to December 19969, and the post crisis period from 
January 2000 to December 2007. In addition, the unit root properties for each variable will 
also be discussed. In this study, we employ three different unit root tests, namely the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Philip Perron (PP) test, and the Kwiatkowski, 
Philips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test for robustness.10  
4.1.1 Domestic Output  
Since the gross domestic product (GDP) data is only available quarterly, the industrial 
production or manufacturing production index are used as a proxy for domestic output (y). 
The output level is expressed in natural log.  From the unit root tests, it can be concluded that 
in most cases output variable is first-differenced stationary for Indonesia and Thailand for 
both sample periods. 
4.1.2 Nominal Exchange Rate  
To examine the importance of the shocks relative to the two major trading partners 
(the US and Japan), our study employs two definitions of nominal exchange rate (e), namely 
the bilateral nominal exchange rate against the US dollar and the bilateral nominal exchange 
rate against the Japanese yen. The nominal exchange rates are expressed as units of foreign 
currency for one unit of domestic currency. Thus, an increase in exchange rate implies a 
domestic currency appreciation. Both nominal exchange rate variables are expressed in 
                                               
9
  Due to data availability, the pre-crisis period for Thailand only starts in January 1988. 
10
   For the sake of brevity, the unit-root test results will not be reported. But they can be made 
available upon request. 
  
 21
natural log. The unit root tests indicate that the nominal exchange rates are first-differenced 
stationary for both Southeast Asian economies during both sample periods. 
4.1.3. Foreign Short-term Interest Rate 
The foreign short-term interest rate is the US federal funds rate when the estimation 
involves nominal exchange rate against the US dollar and Japan’s overnight call rate if it 
involves the Japanese yen. The foreign interest rate variables are expressed in percentage. 
Based on the unit-roots testing, we conclude that foreign interest rates are stationary. The 
findings are also supported by the estimated impulse responses, showing that foreign interest 
rate returns to the baseline quickly with converging error bounds, which is generally not the 
case if the variables are integrated (Artis and Ehrmann, 2000). 
4.1.4. Domestic Short-term Interest Rate 
As in recent studies on monetary policy for Indonesia and Thailand, this study uses 
the 90-day Certificates of Bank Indonesia (SBI) rate and the Bank of Thailand 14-day 
repurchase (Repo) rate as the proxies of short-term interest rate controlled by the central 
banks of these two economies (Berg et al., 2003; Fane, 2005; Fung, 2002).11 The domestic 
interest rate variables are expressed in percentage. In general, the unit root tests reveal  that 
the domestic interest rate is stationary for both countries for both sub-periods. This finding is 
once again supported by the impulse response test results. 
4.1.5. Domestic Price 
                                               
11
 Since the data for the Bank of Thailand 14-day repurchase rate is only available from January 
1997, the call money rate is used for the period before the first data is available. We did not see any 
significant jump or drop at the date when the two rates are combined.  
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The domestic price (p) is measured by the consumer price index (CPI) with year 2000 
as the base year for Indonesia and Thailand. The domestic price is expressed in natural log. 
Most of the unit root tests indicate that domestic price variables of both economies are first-
differenced stationary for both sub-periods. 
 
5.  Test Results 
5.1. Estimates for ω  
 The results for the weights the central banks attach to exchange rate (ω ) for various 
periods are reported in Table 2. All weights for both the rupiah and the baht are found to be 
significant. Turning first to the Indonesian rupiah, our results provide evidence of less rigid 
exchange rate policy against the US dollar during the post-1997 crisis period. The size of the 
(ω ) for the period of 1986-1996 is reported to be around (0.39), and drops to (0.28) for the 
post-1997 crisis period.  In contrast, the Japanese yen continued to receive much less, but 
relatively unchanged weight, sitting within a narrow range of (0.04-0.06). These results seem 
to support the more flexible official (de-jure) regime of exchange rate adopted by Bank 
Indonesia since 1999. Nevertheless, the monetary authority in Indonesia continues to assign 
relatively large weight to the US dollar, suggesting a managed float regime of exchange rate 
against the US dollar. 
In addition, our results seem to suggest that the Bank of Thailand has basically 
pursued the same exchange rate regime in the past two decades. The weight against the US 
dollar during the post-crisis has very much equalled to its pre-crisis level at around 0.33. 
Very much the same analyses can be said as well for the weight of the baht against the yen, 
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albeit a slight drop in (ω ) during the post-crisis period. These findings are consistent with 
those of Baig (2001) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2004).   
 
5.2. Have the rupiah and baht exchange rates been shock absorbers? 
 5.2.1. The Case of the Indonesian Rupiah 
   Turning first to the case of the Indonesian rupiah, the role of exchange rate as a 
shock absorber appears to be much more vital during the pre-1997 financial crisis than during 
the post-crisis period. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, demand shocks during the period of 
1986-1996 were predominantly asymmetric relative to Japan and the US, and therefore 
requiring opposed monetary policy responses. In contrast, demand shocks during the post-
1997 period triggered similar monetary policy responses by the domestic monetary authority 
(via its certificate of Bank Indonesia (SBI) rate) and its counterparts in the US (the US 
federal fund rate) and Japan (the overnight call rate) (Figures 3 and 4). As for the supply 
shocks, there were largely symmetrical relative to the US economy, but asymmetrical relative 
to the Japanese economy during the pre-crisis period. The reverse is however true for the 
post-crisis period. 
 In summary, whereas three out of four real shocks taken place before 1997 were 
asymmetric, the majority of these shocks since 2000 require parallel responses of the 
domestic and foreign monetary policies (Table 3). Given the nature of the shocks, the cost of 
relinquishing the role of exchange rate as a shock absorber should therefore be more 
expensive during the pre-1997 crisis relative to the post-crisis period. More importantly, the 
commitment of Bank Indonesia to introduce more flexibility in its exchange rate policy, 
particularly against the US dollar as indicated by the lesser weight in Table 2, is appropriate 
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to address the asymmetrical supply shocks relative to the US economy in recent years. 
Nevertheless, we do not find the necessity for the shock absorbing capacity of the rupiah 
against the yen during the post-crisis.   
 5.2.2. The Case of the Thailand Baht 
 Based on the natures of the shocks, the necessity to introduce more flexibility in the 
management of the Thailand baht during the post-1997 crisis is arguably more profound than 
during the pre-1997 crisis (Figures 5-8 and Table 3). During the pre-crisis period, real shocks 
were mainly symmetrical relative to the Japanese economy. Hence, the role of exchange rate 
as a shock absorber here was not required. But relative to the US economy, the shocks were 
predominantly asymmetrical, suggesting a respectably high cost of maintaining the soft-US 
dollar peg policy during the pre-1997 crisis. 
 Since 2000, however, the two types of real shocks have largely been asymmetric, 
both relative to the US and the Japanese economies. This implies that there is a rising 
urgency to have a more credible and independent domestic monetary policy to generate 
opposite responses to the real shocks, and thus allowing exchange rate to be a more efficient 
shock absorber. Yet, as reported earlier, the Bank of Thailand continued to maintain 
relatively high weights for the US dollar and only moderately introduced more flexibility of 
the baht against the Japanese yen in its overall management of exchange rate policy. In short, 
given the nature of real shocks since 2000, the persistently rigid management of the Thai baht 
is an example of inconsistent macroeconomic policy response to economic shocks.      
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
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With the liberalization of both current and capital account, the requirement for 
exchange rate to be an instrument of the macroeconomic policy adjustment, i.e. a shock 
absorber, in Indonesia and Thailand has been well documented. Most of these early works 
examined the rigidities of the baht and the rupiah, particularly against the US dollar, and their 
roles in explaining the current account deficits facing these economies prior to the collapse of 
the soft-US dollar peg exchange rate regimes.12 However, hardly any has examined the 
nature of real shocks in the domestic economies of these Southeast Asian nations relative to 
the countries’ major trading partners and the necessity for the exchange rate to be a shock 
absorber domestically. 
Our study finds that real shocks in Indonesia and Thailand relative to its trading 
partners, namely the US and Japan, have been predominantly asymmetrical during both the 
pre- and post-1997 financial crisis. More importantly, we come to a conclusion that the cost 
for relinquishing the role of exchange rate as a shock absorber is relatively greater during the 
pre-crisis period for Indonesia, and during the post-crisis period for Thailand. Yet, we hardly 
observe any firm commitment by the monetary authorities of these two countries to move 
substantially away from the US dollar peg policy, especially by the Bank of Thailand. The 
weights of the US dollar remain respectably high in the overall management of the exchange 
rate of the rupiah and the baht, particular for the latter currency. The still relatively rigid 
exchange rate regimes against the US dollar are prevailing despite the official 
announcements by the monetary authorities to adopt the inflation targeting policy in Thailand 
since May 2000 and in Indonesia since July 2005.          
                                               
12
 See for instance Siregar and Rajan (2005) and Rahmatsyah, et.al. (2002). 
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Table 1: Structural VAR Identifying Restrictions 
 Long run restrictions: 
 
R1: no long run effect of aggregate demand shocks on output 
R2: no long run effect of foreign monetary policy shocks on output 
R3: no long run effect of domestic monetary policy shocks on output 
R4: no long run effect of exchange rate shocks on output 
 
 Short run restrictions: 
 
R5: no contemporaneous effect of foreign monetary policy shocks on output 
R6: no contemporaneous effect of domestic monetary policy shocks on output 
R7: no contemporaneous effect of exchange rate shocks on output 
R8: no contemporaneous effect of domestic monetary policy shocks on foreign 
interest rate  
R9: no contemporaneous effect of exchange rate shocks on foreign interest rate 
R10: the contemporaneous weight,ω , which central banks attached to exchange 
rate development when setting domestic monetary policy, that is, 
e
t
i
t
m
t uu ωωε +−= )1(  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: The estimates of the Weight Attached to Exchange Rate Management  (ω ) 
 
 Indonesia Thailand 
 RP-USD1 RP-YEN2 BAHT-USD3 BAHT-YEN4 
Pre-Crisis: 
(1986:1-1996:12) 
0.39 
(3.23)*** 
0.04 
(1.88)* 
0.33 
(3.72)*** 
0.22 
(6.24)*** 
Post-Crisis: 
(2000:1-2007:12) 
0.28 
(4.43)*** 
0.06 
(2.82)*** 
0.33 
(2.22)** 
0.18 
(6.24)*** 
 
The t-statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
Notes: 
 1).  The (ω ) for RP-USD is estimated using 11 lags, excluding the crisis period observation (1997:1-1999:12); 
 2). The (ω ) for RP-YEN is estimated using 10 lags, excluding the crisis period observation (1997:1-1999:12); 
 3). The (ω ) for BAHT-USD is estimated using 7 lags, excluding the crisis period observation (1997:1-1999:12); 
 4). The (ω ) for BAHT-YEN is estimated using 10 lags, excluding the crisis period observation (1997:1-1999:12); 
 
 Table 3: Summary of Key Findings on the Role of Exchange Rate as a Shock Absorber 
 
 
 Indonesia Thailand 
Pre-crisis Post Crisis Pre-crisis  Post Crisis 
a) Against the US$ 
 
 Supply shocks 
 
 Demand 
Shocks 
  
 
Symmetric 
 
Asymmetric 
 
 
 
 
Asymmetric  
 
Symmetric 
 
 
Asymmetric 
 
Asymmetric 
 
 
Asymmetric 
 
Asymmetric  
b) Against the 
Japanese Yen 
 
 Supply shocks 
 
 Demand 
Shocks 
  
 
 
Asymmetric  
 
Asymmetric 
 
 
 
 
 
Symmetric  
 
Symmetric 
 
 
 
Symmetric 
 
Symmetric 
 
 
 
Asymmetric 
 
Asymmetric  
 
Main Conclusion 
 
 
 
The cost of relinquishing the 
role of exchange rate as a 
shock absorber has arguably 
been more costly in 
Indonesia during the pre-
1997 crisis relative to post-
crisis period.  
 
 
The cost of relinquishing the 
role of exchange rate as a 
shock absorber should 
definitely be more costly in 
Thailand during the post-
1997 crisis period relative to 
pre-crisis period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions for Indonesian Rupiah against US dollar during the Pre-crisis Period 
Impulse Response Functions with w=0.39
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions for Indonesian Rupiah against Japanese Yen during the Pre-crisis Period 
Impulse Response Functions with w=0.04
Indonesia (1986:1 to 1996:12)
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions for Indonesian Rupiah against US dollar during the Post-crisis Period 
Impulse Response Functions with w=0.28
Indonesia (2000:1 to 2007:12)
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions for Indonesian Rupiah against the Japanese Yen during the Post-crisis Period 
Impulse Response Functions with w=0.06
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions for the Thai baht against the US dollar during the Pre-crisis Period 
Impulse Response Function with w=0.33
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions for the Thai baht against the Japanese Yen during the Pre-crisis Period 
Impulse Response Function with w=0.22
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions for the Thai baht against the US dollar during the Post Crisis Period 
Impulse Response Function with w=0.33
THAILAND (2000:1 to 2007:12)
Supply  Shock
O
u
t
p
u
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2 5
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 2 5
0 .0 5 0
Supply  Shock
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 5 0
-0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 0 0
0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 5 0
Supply  Shock
D
o
m
.
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
Supply  Shock
P
r
i
c
e
s
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 4
Supply  Shock
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0 .0 4
Demand  Shock
O
u
t
p
u
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2 5
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 2 5
0 .0 5 0
Demand  Shock
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 5 0
-0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 0 0
0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 5 0
Demand  Shock
D
o
m
.
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
Demand  Shock
P
r
i
c
e
s
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 4
Demand  Shock
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0 .0 4
Foreign MP  Shock
O
u
t
p
u
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2 5
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 2 5
0 .0 5 0
Foreign MP  Shock
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 5 0
-0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 0 0
0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 5 0
Foreign MP  Shock
D
o
m
.
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
Foreign MP  Shock
P
r
i
c
e
s
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 4
Foreign MP  Shock
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0 .0 4
MP  Shock
O
u
t
p
u
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2 5
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 2 5
0 .0 5 0
MP  Shock
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 5 0
-0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 0 0
0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 5 0
MP  Shock
D
o
m
.
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
MP  Shock
P
r
i
c
e
s
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 4
MP  Shock
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0 .0 4
Exch. Rate  Shock
O
u
t
p
u
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2 5
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 2 5
0 .0 5 0
Exch. Rate  Shock
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 5 0
-0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 0 0
0 .0 0 2 5
0 .0 0 5 0
Exch. Rate  Shock
D
o
m
.
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
Exch. Rate  Shock
P
r
i
c
e
s
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 0 4
-0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 0
0 .0 0 2
0 .0 0 4
Exch. Rate  Shock
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
a
t
e
0 2 0 4 0
-0 .0 2
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0 .0 4
 
  
 38
Figure 8: Impulse Response Function for the Thai baht against the Japanese Yen during the post-crisis period 
Impulse Response Function with w=0.18
THAILAND (2000:1 to 2007:12)
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